Russia's unjustifiable war of aggression in Ukraine


Full Member
Problem is Macron will end up blaming the Ukrainians just like Vlad expected it would happen albeit he didn’t expect it to take so long for the unity to come apart.

Macron sees himself as the self appointed leader of Europe.
Is it time for Nato to go all in and put a stop to Russia's aggressions? Call their bluff on the threats to go nuclear?
Is it time for Nato to go all in and put a stop to Russia's aggressions? Call their bluff on the threats to go nuclear?
Putin believes because he has the nuclear threat, a signicant % of worlds oil & gas reserves and now the food weapon - that he's untouchable.

So far, the sanction on oil/gas hasn't worked because of rising prices (Opec) and opportunists like India

The nuclear threat has been decisive so because its curtailed weapon supply by cowardly Westetn Leaders

The Food Weapon will be a huge gain for Vlad

This is going pear shaped so the Western Leaders need to show real leadership

The Appeasement Monkeys (Macron, Scholz, Draghi & the Austrian Lad) are Vlads real Allies

They are clowns and will be on the wrong side of history

We will all pay a big.price for their ineptitude


Full Member

I did not post to avoid spamming as not much really happens right now.
- There are still fights in Severodonieck region, changes daily, today it was reported Ukrainians shot down Ru Su-34 bomber. Ukrainian "Foreign Legion" is fighting there, already some loses reported in the western media. All three bridges are now destroyed by Russians. Below is the situational map by Ukrainians from yesterday:


- Ukrainians asked over the weekend for the "silence" on all associated news aggregators like OSiNT, Oryx etc. which usually were providing a reliable sources for news at front and with equipment movement. It is being rumored it is because of shifting forces towards South. We will probably learn very soon.
- Turks agreed to work to solve Russian blockade of grain transport for only 25%, French want to send their "help", Chinese in January were buying out grain reserves putting them in not the best light, Ukrainian grain already started to ship via Baltic ports.
- There are now discussions on help and lack of it too ahead preparations to the NATO Summit, which starts soon. Not much going out apart from propaganda, wishful thinking and political crap ;)
- Estonians are sending anti-drone systems (30+) from another crowdfunding action. They sent Baykartar drone first and Turkish company gave it for free and the money donated to charity.
- Russian trolls online are now aiming at nationalism and xenophobia to start fights between "the Westerners".

Some random stuff:

A photo of a Russian landing craft damaged on June 2 at the mouth of the Dnieper has leaked.




The Bayraktar rocket hit a closed landing compartment, fortunately for the Russians, apparently empty:




and below is taken from the deep wreckage of Siena type boat sank by Ukrainians near Snake Island:


Some UK-donated vehicles confirmed to arrive sound to the destination:

Pinzgauer Vector 6x6:



and Husky:



Military update next post:


Full Member
Military Update based on the comment to the @JominiW on TT (check this user!) from one of the military boards I am on:

the original thread (worth checking - more details!):

General situation

The front line along the Doniec river is stabilizing:


This is a potential truce line, as crossing it will be practically impossible at the moment. This would in theory be feasible in the vicinity of Kharkiv, but only on the condition that the Russian forces, which are now withdrawing north or even rebuilding in the territory of the Russian Federation, would be tied up in the south (around Izium, Slavyansk, etc.), and Ukraine would have firepower which it does not currently have, for many reasons, not just delayed US deliveries. It would also be very problematic to conduct combat operations without the necessary air defense. The Russians in this area do not have an air force that would be able to stop the Ukrainian attack of the appropriate force, but losses on crossing terrain obstacles would be problematic if there was an effective line of defense on the ground. So, unfortunately, it looks like this area is lost at the moment and its recovery will be a separate operation that will require an appropriate strategy - also guerrilla and social resistance on the territory - and will depend on whether it is in Washington's interest that this area be recovered by Ukraine. Since the conflict in Ukraine plays a key role in influencing EU policy, the long-term loss of this area by Ukraine - but without formal recognition of the loss of territory, i.e. freezing the conflict according to the Korean or Vietnamese (or Syrian / Kurdish - if we refer to the recent conflicts) model - may be Washington's strategic goal. It is difficult to determine to what extent the current actions in Washington reflect the deliberate forcing of such a situation,

On the map, I pay attention to the Izium area - there is a link to the units of the Baltic Fleet, i.e. those stationed in the Kaliningrad District. Visible better in full resolution here:

What kind of units are they and how were they transported? Fact? Maskirowka (fake action - catcha)? I am very curious about it.

Kharkiv district

The situation north of Kharkiv looks problematic. In particular, the unknown number of units of the 1st and 20th Armies being played. The withdrawal of the Russian forces from this area should not be expected for the time being, as they secure the Donets line and key locations such as Vovtchansk or Kupiansk (sorry if I butchered English transcription - catcha)

Donbas district boiler area

The most important fights are not fought for Severodonetsk, but all the time in the area of the Izium salient to flank Slavyansk and cut off one of the main communication lines. According to the map, the defense in this area is made up of the 3rd and 4th Armored Brigades, the 81st Assault and Assault Brigade and the 10th Mountain Brigade. In his comment, the militarist claimed that 4BPanc units took part in the recovery of Severodonetsk, but I cannot say on what scale and to what extent this is a correct interpretation of the situation. Two armored brigades in the area of Slavyansk in the direction of the attack of the units of the 2nd Motor Rifle Division along with the reserve of the 4th Armored Division potentially recreating in the north in the area of Kupiansk are the right units in the right place, hence the suggestion that 4BPanc would move to the insignificant Severodoniecek, which is primarily an area of binding and delaying actions. The loss of Severodonetsk will not have a significant operational significance, in fact even the loss of Lysychansk will not bring a significant change.

Only the breaking of the Sloviyansk-Kramatorsk-Konstyantynivka line causes a significant change in operating conditions. The Donets Line is not to be crossed by Ukraine in the near future, so the strategic position is already stabilized and, for example, truce lines can be run along the river. The operational situation can only change when one of the sides controls these key cities, and the Russians still need some more.


This map shows that most of the fighting in Sewierodonetsk is fought between light forces. Unidentified mechanized units are plotted, but in support. 128 Mountain Brigade and 4th Rapid Reaction Brigade GN are standard mechanized units. The 57th Motorized Brigade and the 111th and 115th TD Brigades may have tanks in stock, but they are light and motorized infantry units with limited support. I base such conclusions on the basis of recordings that I saw with the use of tanks that allegedly - according to the author of the recording - were in the state of TD brigades, here specifically: 110 BOT.

to be continued
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Full Member
Zaporizhia district

The front line seems to be stabilized here. According to liveuamap, it has not changed since June 1. The terrain conditions do not favor the Russians offensively, and the advantage in the air prevents the Ukrainians from counter-offensive. I suppose that in this section the front will be largely static until there is a significant operational breach of the defense lines, either in the Donbas Basin or in the Kherson region. In particular, if the defense on the west bank of the Dnieper begins to break down, there may be a tactical retreat from part of the occupied territory, but in order to maintain communication. To withdraw from this area, it would be absolutely necessary to defeat the Russian forces, seize Nowa Kakhovka, encircle Kherson and attack Perekop. Then the Russians would be forced to go on the defensive along the Donets line and move some of their units to the south. Most likely, they would try to ambush Ukrainians by freeing part of the area and then threaten with a counterattack on Zaporozhye, because in a situation where Ukraine successfully recovers the west bank of the Dnieper, there is practically no point in trying to keep Kherson. It would require a great counter-offensive, and Russia has no funds for this without mobilization.

Chersonia district

The area of the counter-offensive has changed, suggesting that the lack of progress is not evidence of the lack of a counter-offensive, but of intense fighting and the maintenance of defense lines by the Russians. Mechanized units were moved to the northwest. Brigade 205 defends the Vysokopilye region, and Kherson is defended by the 20th Division, which was previously located on the other side of the Dnieper. Brigades 126 and 34, which previously held the front, withdrew from the fighting area, which may suggest that they were slightly depleted. The Inhulc line is maintained by VDV units, which also indicates that the attack from the north is more intense. Overall, the map suggests that the counteroffensive continues and has limited success as the Russians are forced to engage more forces .

An interesting case is the dislocation of the 5th Armored Brigade - belonging to the Reserve Corps, but already successfully mobilized for hostilities - as the Kryvyi Rih. Previously, recordings of alleged 5BPanc troops in the north-east of the country appeared. The unit was identified by recognizing the Polish T-72M1 tanks and the Dutch YPR-765 transporters, with which 5 BPanzers were allegedly equipped. It is not really known, but an armored brigade in the Kherson area would change a lot. The standard composition is 3bcz, 1bz and 1bzmot, i.e. a total of about 140 tanks and 66 IFVs, and additional vehicles with a full artillery battalion.

The second stage of the attack involves the capture of the Vysokopilye region. If the 60BZmech fighting there successfully creates a breach, the 5BPanc will enter it, moving along the main road on the eastern shore of Inhulc. According to this map, everything follows the most rational tactical patterns. If the 5BPanc is in a different area of the SZU, they will be forced to attack with a different formation, less adapted to such raids. Armored units are used for such operations - to perform dynamic raids to the rear of the enemy's position after the defense is interrupted. If the 5BPanc is in Kryvyi Rih then I suppose the Ukrainians are desperately waiting for the MLRSs that will allow them to crush the Russian artillery and rocket artillery from 227BArt so that tanks can roll ~ 80 through the Russian positions and force a retreat more or less according to the scheme, which I drew. The defense in Kherson led by 20DZmot will be too strong and the attacks in this area are aimed at binding the defender's forces.

Coast and Black Sea

The map is most likely a bug because it shows the 5BPanc in the old dislocation site before mobilization, just like from the beginning of the invasion.

The dislocation of the S-300 units in the Tatarbunary region is puzzling. I don't understand what exactly they would be doing there. In my opinion, the threat from the side of Snake Island is negligible. Most likely, they simply protect the infrastructure, possibly transit on the border with Romania, and the operational facilities of other units. The Russians are strengthening their garrison on the Snake Island, but it must be stated directly that the Snake Island is 660m wide and 440m long, with a total area of 0.17km2, so whatever the Russians do not place there will be plowed and ground with debris if the MLRS battery arrives in the area.


It is difficult for me to imagine under what conditions the air defense systems transported by the Russians are to maintain their position. You have to dig bunkers and hide as soon as the salvo echoes appear on the radars. It doesn't make any sense.

Nothing significant is happening there and it does not look like it will change, because the Russians do not have the forces that could successfully fight anything in this area. If we add to this any anti-ship missiles at the disposal of Ukraine, any action becomes too risky. In previous entries, I explained how limited the air defense system is at the Charnomorsk Fleet and that when operating outside the range of the 9M96E S-400 missiles in Crimea, it must fully rely on air cover, which has its predictable limitations and therefore is not an effective obstacle, which forces the Russians to limit the scale activities.

What the map does not show is the occupation of the Kiburn Peninsula - the westernmost headland on the eastern side of the Dnieper. Theoretically, it blocks the exit from the Dnieper and Mykolaiv. The attack on the port in Ochakiv - a photo of the sunken Vinnitsa corvette and a landing ship of the Ukrainian Navy, which successfully avoided shelling, was inserted into the thread - it had no significant significance because this port was evacuated from the beginning of the war. The "Vinnitsa" corvette is also no loss, as it was an old Grisha-class ship, completely unsuitable for combat or even patrol operations under the present conditions. At present, the Ukrainian Navy does not have any large warships in working order and does not count as a combat formation, so it makes no sense to consider what the effect of the loss of ships would have. These are only propaganda activities of the Russians who are trying to show success when they cannot demonstrate such success in the fighting areas.

In summary:

The situation on the map looks bad, but without any forecasts that Ukraine's situation will worsen. There is no indication of this from the information that reaches us. Unfortunately, there is no indication that the situation will improve significantly. It is very problematic to delay the counter-offensive, which in the long run will have very negative effects, unless the Russians' ability to fight completely collapses. At some point, the Russians will restore some of their forces, which will mean that despite the general level of losses on the side of the Russians, the SZU counteroffensive will not be effective enough to significantly change the situation on the map.

I would be very happy if Waldemar Skrzypczak's (retired Polish general, in charge of Iraq missions - catcha) comments were correct, suggesting the end of this month or the beginning of the next as the cut-off date at which the Russians will achieve the level of losses, equipment and ammunition wear which they will not be able to replenish in a short period sufficiently to stop any offensive actions SZU. I am not able to judge when such a breakdown of the Russian forces could take place because for this we need much more detailed intelligence about the losses and the condition of both sides, which I do not have, even at a basic level. I do not make such estimates for my own needs, I noted what interested me in this conflict. There is now a very classic material war going on,

We must therefore wait for a clear attack to form, for example, in the Kherson region in the coming 2-3 weeks, and in particular for attempts to cross the Dnieper. Floating BWP-1s are rather original ideas of Waldemar Skrzypczak, but it is possible to:


In the case of the Dnieper, if Ukraine has rocket artillery with a range of 70 km, then a strike from both directions - and from Kherson and Zaporizhia - supported with attacks on the Kharkiv Reservoir and guerrilla activities. Russian AF will not be able to play a significant role because in this conflict it has already shown its limitations to search for and attack precise targets and small groups of enemy. Only helis carry out such missions relatively effectively, and these are to be stopped.
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