continued...
Zaporizhia district
The front line seems to be stabilized here. According to liveuamap, it has not changed since June 1. The terrain conditions do not favor the Russians offensively, and the advantage in the air prevents the Ukrainians from counter-offensive. I suppose that in this section the front will be largely static until there is a significant operational breach of the defense lines, either in the Donbas Basin or in the Kherson region. In particular, if the defense on the west bank of the Dnieper begins to break down, there may be a tactical retreat from part of the occupied territory, but in order to maintain communication. To withdraw from this area, it would be absolutely necessary to defeat the Russian forces, seize Nowa Kakhovka, encircle Kherson and attack Perekop. Then the Russians would be forced to go on the defensive along the Donets line and move some of their units to the south. Most likely, they would try to ambush Ukrainians by freeing part of the area and then threaten with a counterattack on Zaporozhye, because in a situation where Ukraine successfully recovers the west bank of the Dnieper, there is practically no point in trying to keep Kherson. It would require a great counter-offensive, and Russia has no funds for this without mobilization.
Chersonia district
The area of the counter-offensive has changed, suggesting that the lack of progress is not evidence of the lack of a counter-offensive, but of intense fighting and the maintenance of defense lines by the Russians. Mechanized units were moved to the northwest. Brigade 205 defends the Vysokopilye region, and Kherson is defended by the 20th Division, which was previously located on the other side of the Dnieper. Brigades 126 and 34, which previously held the front, withdrew from the fighting area, which may suggest that they were slightly depleted. The Inhulc line is maintained by VDV units, which also indicates that the attack from the north is more intense. Overall, the map suggests that the
counteroffensive continues and has limited success as the Russians are forced to engage more forces .
An interesting case is the dislocation of the 5th Armored Brigade - belonging to the Reserve Corps, but already successfully mobilized for hostilities - as the Kryvyi Rih. Previously, recordings of alleged 5BPanc troops in the north-east of the country appeared. The unit was identified by recognizing the Polish T-72M1 tanks and the Dutch YPR-765 transporters, with which 5 BPanzers were allegedly equipped. It is not really known, but an armored brigade in the Kherson area would change a lot. The standard composition is 3bcz, 1bz and 1bzmot, i.e. a total of about 140 tanks and 66 IFVs, and additional vehicles with a full artillery battalion.
The second stage of the attack involves the capture of the Vysokopilye region. If the 60BZmech fighting there successfully creates a breach, the 5BPanc will enter it, moving along the main road on the eastern shore of Inhulc. According to this map, everything follows the most rational tactical patterns. If the 5BPanc is in a different area of the SZU, they will be forced to attack with a different formation, less adapted to such raids. Armored units are used for such operations - to perform dynamic raids to the rear of the enemy's position after the defense is interrupted. If the 5BPanc is in Kryvyi Rih then I suppose the Ukrainians are desperately waiting for the MLRSs that will allow them to crush the Russian artillery and rocket artillery from 227BArt so that tanks can roll ~ 80 through the Russian positions and force a retreat more or less according to the scheme, which I drew. The defense in Kherson led by 20DZmot will be too strong and the attacks in this area are aimed at binding the defender's forces.
Coast and Black Sea
The map is most likely a bug because it shows the 5BPanc in the old dislocation site before mobilization, just like from the beginning of the invasion.
The dislocation of the S-300 units in the Tatarbunary region is puzzling. I don't understand what exactly they would be doing there. In my opinion, the threat from the side of Snake Island is negligible. Most likely, they simply protect the infrastructure, possibly transit on the border with Romania, and the operational facilities of other units. The Russians are strengthening their garrison on the Snake Island, but it must be stated directly that the Snake Island is 660m wide and 440m long, with a total area of 0.17km2, so whatever the Russians do not place there will be plowed and ground with debris if the MLRS battery arrives in the area.
It is difficult for me to imagine under what conditions the air defense systems transported by the Russians are to maintain their position. You have to dig bunkers and hide as soon as the salvo echoes appear on the radars. It doesn't make any sense.
Nothing significant is happening there and it does not look like it will change, because the Russians do not have the forces that could successfully fight anything in this area. If we add to this any anti-ship missiles at the disposal of Ukraine, any action becomes too risky. In previous entries, I explained how limited the air defense system is at the Charnomorsk Fleet and that when operating outside the range of the 9M96E S-400 missiles in Crimea, it must fully rely on air cover, which has its
predictable limitations and therefore is not an effective obstacle, which forces the Russians to limit the scale activities.
What the map does not show is the occupation of the Kiburn Peninsula - the westernmost headland on the eastern side of the Dnieper. Theoretically, it blocks the exit from the Dnieper and Mykolaiv. The attack on the port in Ochakiv - a photo of the sunken Vinnitsa corvette and a landing ship of the Ukrainian Navy, which successfully avoided shelling, was inserted into the thread - it had no significant significance because this port was evacuated from the beginning of the war. The "Vinnitsa" corvette is also no loss, as it was an old Grisha-class ship, completely unsuitable for combat or even patrol operations under the present conditions. At present, the Ukrainian Navy does not have any large warships in working order and does not count as a combat formation, so it makes no sense to consider what the effect of the loss of ships would have. These are only propaganda activities of the Russians who are trying to show success when they cannot demonstrate such success in the fighting areas.
In summary:
The situation on the map looks bad, but without any forecasts that Ukraine's situation will worsen. There is no indication of this from the information that reaches us. Unfortunately, there is no indication that the situation will improve significantly. It is very problematic to delay the counter-offensive, which in the long run will have very negative effects, unless the Russians' ability to fight completely collapses. At some point, the Russians will restore some of their forces, which will mean that despite the general level of losses on the side of the Russians, the SZU counteroffensive will not be effective enough to significantly change the situation on the map.
I would be very happy if Waldemar Skrzypczak's (retired Polish general, in charge of Iraq missions - catcha) comments were correct, suggesting the end of this month or the beginning of the next as the cut-off date at which the Russians will achieve the level of losses, equipment and ammunition wear which they will not be able to replenish in a short period sufficiently to stop any offensive actions SZU. I am not able to judge when such a breakdown of the Russian forces could take place because for this we need much more detailed intelligence about the losses and the condition of both sides, which I do not have, even at a basic level. I do not make such estimates for my own needs, I noted what interested me in this conflict. There is now a very classic material war going on,
We must therefore wait for a clear attack to form, for example, in the Kherson region in the coming 2-3 weeks, and in particular for attempts to cross the Dnieper. Floating BWP-1s are rather original ideas of Waldemar Skrzypczak, but it is possible to:
bit.ly
In the case of the Dnieper, if Ukraine has rocket artillery with a range of 70 km, then a strike from both directions - and from Kherson and Zaporizhia - supported with attacks on the Kharkiv Reservoir and guerrilla activities. Russian AF will not be able to play a significant role because in this conflict it has already shown its limitations to search for and attack precise targets and small groups of enemy. Only helis carry out such missions relatively effectively, and these are to be stopped.
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