an liathroid beag
Full Member
Turning Point?
"The Russian spring offensive in Donbas has yielded no territorial gains and has even suffered several retreats driven by Ukrainian counterattacks (Meduza, March 31; Slovo i Dilo, April 9). Official Russian commentary ignores this setback, but jingoist bloggers have been making a lot of noise about the lack of reserves needed to regain momentum (TopWar.ru, April 8; Izvestiya, April 10). The main cause of this transformation of the battlefield is the new edge Ukraine has gained in drone warfare by combining saturation of the tactical zone with first-person view (FPV) drones and mid-range strikes, so that the effective “kill-zone” is expanded to some 120 kilometers (74.5 miles) (Re: Russia, March 20). The balance of territorial advances may have shifted imperceptibly, but it effectively undercuts Putin’s claim that the whole Donbas will be occupied either through a deal or by force (Kommersant, April 10).
The botched attacks and crippled logistics result in record numbers of casualties in the Russian army. The documented number of 208,755 fatalities hardly makes half of the real losses of life (Mediazona, April 10). Since the start of the year, Russia’s commercial recruitment system has been unable to attract a sufficient number of mercenaries to compensate for mounting losses, and this gap keeps widening (Important Stories, February 26; NV.ua, April 10). Neither the spreading campaign to recruit students, nor the pressure on the fresh draftees conscripted since April 1 to sign contracts for combat units can yield the required volume of manpower (Current time, April 3; Meduza, April 7). Regional authorities are compelled to raise bonuses for signing contracts, but the supply of “volunteers” still cannot meet demand (Agents Media, April 10). These payments add considerably to regional budget crises, and taxation increases bring widespread discontent, aggravated by the underfunding of responses to various local emergencies, such as the foot-and-mouth epidemic in Southern Siberia (Forbes.ru, March 25;Novaya gazeta Europe, April 8).
Ukraine in March managed to gain an advantage over Russia in the number of long-distance drone attacks, setting the mark above 7,300 strikes (The Moscow Times, April 6). The data on these activities is quite unreliable, but the devastating impact of Ukrainian drone hits on Russian energy infrastructure, including platforms in the Caspian Sea, is beyond doubt (Rubrika, April 10). Repeated attacks on oil terminals in Novorossiysk, Primorsk, and Ust-Luga have effectively denied Russia the opportunity to profit from the spike in oil prices driven by the conflict in the Gulf (Re: Russia, April 7). A new feature of Ukrainian drone warfare is the increased targeting of Russian air defense systems, including radars, which weakens the protection of many crucial assets exactly when the intensity of the threat goes up (Radio Svoboda, April 11).
Russian attempts to resort to nuclear blackmail or demonstrate its strategic muscle have also notably declined. Putin has avoided any nuclear bragging in his infrequent public appearances, and “patriotic” social media has turned to debates over the prospects of arms control (TopWar.ru, April 11; Kommersant, April 12). Dmitry Trenin, an advocate for nuclear escalation, has been promoted to president of the Russian International Affairs Council and has transitioned to a more sober discourse (RIAC, April 3). Moscow has also cut down on its hybrid attacks on its European neighbors and has been refraining from any counter-measures against the arrests of its “shadow fleet” ships (Fontanka.ru, April 10). A demarch by the Russian Foreign Ministry was the only step taken after the claim that the Baltic states opened air corridors for Ukrainian drone strikes on Primorsk and Ust-Luga, and Russian media noted that it was flatly turned down (RBC, April 10)."
"The Russian spring offensive in Donbas has yielded no territorial gains and has even suffered several retreats driven by Ukrainian counterattacks (Meduza, March 31; Slovo i Dilo, April 9). Official Russian commentary ignores this setback, but jingoist bloggers have been making a lot of noise about the lack of reserves needed to regain momentum (TopWar.ru, April 8; Izvestiya, April 10). The main cause of this transformation of the battlefield is the new edge Ukraine has gained in drone warfare by combining saturation of the tactical zone with first-person view (FPV) drones and mid-range strikes, so that the effective “kill-zone” is expanded to some 120 kilometers (74.5 miles) (Re: Russia, March 20). The balance of territorial advances may have shifted imperceptibly, but it effectively undercuts Putin’s claim that the whole Donbas will be occupied either through a deal or by force (Kommersant, April 10).
The botched attacks and crippled logistics result in record numbers of casualties in the Russian army. The documented number of 208,755 fatalities hardly makes half of the real losses of life (Mediazona, April 10). Since the start of the year, Russia’s commercial recruitment system has been unable to attract a sufficient number of mercenaries to compensate for mounting losses, and this gap keeps widening (Important Stories, February 26; NV.ua, April 10). Neither the spreading campaign to recruit students, nor the pressure on the fresh draftees conscripted since April 1 to sign contracts for combat units can yield the required volume of manpower (Current time, April 3; Meduza, April 7). Regional authorities are compelled to raise bonuses for signing contracts, but the supply of “volunteers” still cannot meet demand (Agents Media, April 10). These payments add considerably to regional budget crises, and taxation increases bring widespread discontent, aggravated by the underfunding of responses to various local emergencies, such as the foot-and-mouth epidemic in Southern Siberia (Forbes.ru, March 25;Novaya gazeta Europe, April 8).
Ukraine in March managed to gain an advantage over Russia in the number of long-distance drone attacks, setting the mark above 7,300 strikes (The Moscow Times, April 6). The data on these activities is quite unreliable, but the devastating impact of Ukrainian drone hits on Russian energy infrastructure, including platforms in the Caspian Sea, is beyond doubt (Rubrika, April 10). Repeated attacks on oil terminals in Novorossiysk, Primorsk, and Ust-Luga have effectively denied Russia the opportunity to profit from the spike in oil prices driven by the conflict in the Gulf (Re: Russia, April 7). A new feature of Ukrainian drone warfare is the increased targeting of Russian air defense systems, including radars, which weakens the protection of many crucial assets exactly when the intensity of the threat goes up (Radio Svoboda, April 11).
Russian attempts to resort to nuclear blackmail or demonstrate its strategic muscle have also notably declined. Putin has avoided any nuclear bragging in his infrequent public appearances, and “patriotic” social media has turned to debates over the prospects of arms control (TopWar.ru, April 11; Kommersant, April 12). Dmitry Trenin, an advocate for nuclear escalation, has been promoted to president of the Russian International Affairs Council and has transitioned to a more sober discourse (RIAC, April 3). Moscow has also cut down on its hybrid attacks on its European neighbors and has been refraining from any counter-measures against the arrests of its “shadow fleet” ships (Fontanka.ru, April 10). A demarch by the Russian Foreign Ministry was the only step taken after the claim that the Baltic states opened air corridors for Ukrainian drone strikes on Primorsk and Ust-Luga, and Russian media noted that it was flatly turned down (RBC, April 10)."
